Contracts

Deployed on BNB Chain mainnet, chain ID 8453. Every one of them is verified on Basescan, so the code below the links is the code that runs.

Your coin's own contract

Every coin launched here is a PairToken, and every one of them shows as verified without anyone submitting it. That is not a courtesy — PairToken takes no constructor arguments (it calls back into the launchpad for its name, symbol and supply), so the creation bytecode is byte-identical every time. One instance was verified; the explorer matches all the others, including coins that do not exist yet.

What that verified source says, and what it therefore cannot do: fixed supply set once in the constructor, no mint function, no transfer tax, no blacklist, no pause, no owner.

External contracts it uses

Calls worth knowing

Before launching

// Non-reverting. Returns whether it would be allowed, and why not if not.
registry.status(address quote)
  returns (bool eligible, Decision decision, Report report)

// The bar this particular asset has to clear — $15,000 if listed, $50,000 if not.
registry.requiredDepthUsdE8(address quote) returns (uint256)

Naming a v4 pool

Every other venue can be searched: a factory answers getPair(a, b) or getPool(a, b, fee). Pancake Infinity's singleton cannot — a pool is identified by the hash of its key, and the key contains a 160-bit hook address, so it can be verified but never enumerated. A v4 pool therefore has to be named once before the gate can see it. Anyone may do it, once, for everyone.

v4Gate.registerPool(PoolKey key) returns (address token)
v4Gate.registerLaunch(address token) returns (address)   // for a coin launched here
v4Gate.probe(PoolKey key) returns (uint256 usdE8, address anchor)   // read-only, changes nothing

Nothing equivalent is needed for the V2-shaped venues or for PancakeSwap V3 and PancakeSwap V3: those are searched directly, so a coin with a market there is usable the moment its address is pasted in.

Launching

launchpad.launch(LaunchConfig cfg) payable returns (address token, bytes32 poolId)
launchpad.predictToken(address creator, bytes32 salt) returns (address)
launchpad.launchFee() returns (uint256)

LaunchConfig carries, beyond the obvious:

After launching

// Anyone can call. Proceeds only ever reach the recorded recipient, the sink and the treasury.
feeVault.collect(address token)

// Creator only. Both take effect from the next collect.
feeVault.setFeeRoute(address token, FeeRoute route)
feeVault.setFeeRecipient(address token, address recipient)

// Reads
launchpad.launchOf(address token)                              // a public mapping: an unnamed tuple
feeVault.launchOf(address token) returns (Launch)              // includes the PoolKey
feeVault.feeRouteOf(address token) returns (FeeRoute)
feeVault.feeRecipientOf(address token) returns (address)
feeVault.owed(address token, address who) returns (uint256)    // a payout that could not be pushed
feeVault.claim(address token)                                  // collect one

Where the liquidity lock actually lives

There is no lock contract and no locked LP token, because Pancake Infinity has no LP tokens at all — a position is a storage slot keyed by (owner, tickLower, tickUpper, salt). The usual "liquidity locked" detectors look for LP tokens sent to a burn address or a locker, and here there is nothing of the sort for them to find.

What holds instead is a property of FeeVault, and now that its source is published you can check it rather than believe it: no code path in the vault ever passes a negative liquidityDelta. Collecting fees calls modifyLiquidity with a delta of exactly zero. There is no withdraw, no emergency exit, and no owner function that adds one. The float cannot come back out — not by the creator, not by us.

Owner powers

The owner can retune the depth bars, the fee bounds, the launch fee, the treasury, the buyback sink, the curated list, the gates and their parameters. It cannot touch a launch's liquidity, change an existing launch's creator share, or redirect a creator's fees.

Ownership transfer is two-step everywhere: a handover that is never accepted leaves the current owner in place rather than sending the protocol to a wrong address.

Today the owner is a single EOA. It should be a multisig behind a timelock, and the contracts do not enforce that themselves.

None of this has been audited.